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 Each of us who is capable of thought is equally capable of deducing that he or she 
exists. This simple idea, that we could not be the subject of an experience without also 
existing, goes back to Augustine and was further popularized by Descartes (Descartes, 
1996) (Cochrane, 1944). Simply by referring to myself with the referential term “I,” I 
seem to imply that something exists that is identical to “me.” But knowing we exist is by 
no means equivalent with knowing what we are. We have developed several terms with 
which to refer to ourselves as a kind: human beings, humans, people, persons, mankind, 
etc. But it is far from obvious what it takes to count as a human being or a person, for 
example, and even whether there are non-human persons or human non-persons In this 
paper, I aim to explore a view for what we essentially are; we generally agree that we are 
persons, but are we persons by necessity or accidentally? For example, could I continue 
to exist while no longer being a person, after a terrible accident? We have common-sense 
intuitions about what we are, and many of these may turn out to be correct, though none 
goes unchallenged. Views that deny intuitions in an attempt to save others have arisen 
from animalists, followers of Hume, et al. We generally consider ourselves to be these 
things that think and have bodies and move around and occupy a certain amount of space. 
Some of these properties we have essentially, and others we could continue to exist 
without — for instance, I could occupy more or less space than I do now. This raises 
questions regarding what kinds of changes could I undergo. But the question I wish to 
explore is: What kind of object am I most fundamentally?  
 The goal of this paper will be to examine some views regarding which of the 
aforementioned qualities, among others, are essential to my existence, and some 
objections to those views. In so doing, I hope to offer a new view that avoids some of 
those objections to the existing views — specifically objections concerning the 
relationships between persons, animals, bodies, and minds. 
 We can begin by asking about the precise relationship between ourselves (on the 
one hand), and the entities we call ‘persons’, ‘bodies’ and ‘animals’ on the other. Here it 
is useful to consider three claims about those things, to which I will refer often 
throughout this paper: Suppose I am the only person in my room. Then, in my room right 
now... 
(1) There exists something that is essentially a person.  
(2) There exists something that is essentially a human organism but not essentially a 
person.  
(3) There exists something that is essentially a body but not essentially an organism. 
 Which of these claims are true? Though some combinations of these three claims or 
their negations result in rather outlandish views, no straightforward contradiction arises 
from any combination of these three claims or their negations; moreover, the anti-
essentialist could even deny all three outright. That said, each appears to be true when we 
consider the way we commonly think about each of the three objects. We can begin by 
considering some straightforward intuitions in favor of each claim; we will reconsider 
each claim at length in subsequent sections. 
 For example, consider (3). Most of us think that, assuming an organism dies in such 
a way that its body does not disintegrate, there would be something shaped like that 
organism that continues to exist after its death. This we call its body. But assuming an 
organism goes out of existence when it dies, the body cannot be essentially an organism 
 It also seems plausible that, were a person’s head cut off (or a person’s brain 
removed, save for the brain stem) and the rest of the body kept functioning by machines, 
a human organism would survive the ordeal even though the person would not. Again, it 
seems that these objects cannot be identical, or we would have a single object that both 
did and did not survive the same incident. 
 The view that seems evident from this, and the view I am going to defend in this 
paper, is that these three distinct objects all exist in the same physical space. I will refer 
to objects that coincide spatially in this manner as “colocated.” 
 In defending the acceptance of (1), (2), and (3), I will first examine arguments 
which deny the plausibility of colocated objects altogether, regardless of whether any of 
those objects would be generally considered “alive.” I will then address objections 
specifically to colocation of living things.  
Having shown that a theory of persons, organisms, and bodies which includes 
colocation can withstand all objections raised on the grounds of colocation, I will argue 
for a specific view of what persons, organisms, bodies, and minds truly are and how they 
are related to one another and the self, ultimately supporting the simple premise, “Persons 
and only persons are objects of first-person reference” (Noonan, 2010). 
 
Part I: Colocated Material Objects 
 By far the most common case discussed when it comes to colocated objects is the 
statue and the lump. The general situation is as follows: Suppose we have a lump of some 
material, perhaps clay, and we fashion it into a statue depicting a specific human form. If 
you were to show that statue to a layperson and inquire as to how many objects that 
person was being shown, they would likely respond that there is only a single object — 
the statue. However, it seems strange to claim that the lump of clay has ceased to exist 
and been replaced by the statue, so where is the lump of clay? Judith Jarvis Thomson lays 
out the simplest example of this quite neatly. Suppose you fashioned the lump of clay 
into the statue at 1 p.m. in the afternoon, and that was your first time ever sculpting. At 9 
a.m. that morning, the clay existed, but the statue did not (Thomson, 1998). The clay has 
the property of having existed at 9 a.m., but the statue does not, so it seems intuitively 
they cannot be numerically the same object. 
  Equally puzzling is the question of what happens if the statue is squished: A lump 
of clay can survive squishing but a statue cannot. Particularly because of this intuition 
regarding persistence conditions and survival, it appears that there are at least two 
colocated objects: the state and the clay lump. This is the view that I support, but in order 
to do so I must show it can be defended against some important objections and alternative 
views1 that have been raised. While my discussion of the first two objections in this 
section will be discussed in terms of statues and their materials, the last two will be 
discussed more generally in terms of material objects, though I will endeavor to show 
their applicability to statue-lump cases as well. 
 
Alternative 1: Contingent Identity 
 There are some worthwhile objections to the view that the statue and the clay 
lump are distinct, colocated objects. Some of these objections arise as solutions to the 
problem that multiple objects occupying the exact same space seems impossible, or at 
least greatly counterintuitive. It would seem to be a problem for colocation if there is a 
better way to save the intuitions about bodies, animals, and persons that we sketched 
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above, without having to violate the intuition that there is only one object in the room. 
Based on this problem, some alternative views have been developed to escape the 
perceived problems with colocation. The first view I will discuss in this paper is the 
notion of “contingent identity” as detailed by Allan Gibbard. 
Identity is thought by many essentialists to hold necessarily wherever there is a 
genuine identity relation. If A is identical to B, for all properties possessed by A, those 
properties must be possessed by B, and vice versa. This is simply Leibniz’s Law. As 
Michael Jubien put it (Jubien, 1993):  
Undoubtedly there are some relations that behave in some respects like identity 
but which do not hold of necessity. I believe it is a fundamental error to think that 
one of these relations actually is the identity relation, that is, to think that identity 
actually doesn’t hold of necessity. I also believe it is seriously misleading to agree 
that none of these relations is the identity relation, but nevertheless to dub one of 
them ‘contingent identity.’ 
To claim, then, that A and B could be identical even though there are some properties — 
such as persistence conditions or having existed at some past time T — which they do not 
share appears untenable. 
The proponent of contingent identity has one response compatible with Leibniz’s 
Law, and that response is well laid out by Gibbard. It is to say that specific material 
objects do not have such modal dispositional properties as having existed at some time in 
the past or having the potential to be destroyed in some way in the future (Gibbard, 
1975). Gibbard refers specifically to the fact that the statue could be rolled up into a ball 
before the clay has dried, and shows that in this instance there is a lump of clay after the 
ordeal, but no statue. Yet he still maintains that the two are contingently identical, with 
contingent identity defined as such: A = B & ◊(A exists & B exists & A ≠ B). 
 How does this view apply to the case of human beings? Usually, one’s body seems 
to survive one’s death, and in such a case Gibbard would not claim that one is 
contingently identical to one’s body. But Gibbard’s view raises the important question 
whether we can use merely modal facts — especially persistence conditions — to 
distinguish completely colocated objects. For example, someone might hold that she and 
the organism with which she is colocated both came into existence at conception and will 
as a matter of fact die at the same time. In that case, does it follow that she is identical to 
an organism? Or can she distinguish herself from her organism by considering merely 
possible cases in which, for example, most of her brain is removed and transplanted into 
another body? That is, can objects be distinguished by a mere difference in persistence 
conditions even if they in fact overlap completely in spacetime? 
 Given how intuitive and simple the assigning of persistence conditions generally 
seems, the burden is on Gibbard to explain why exactly we cannot ascribe specific modal 
or dispositional properties (such as a statue’s disposition to be destroyed if rolled up into 
a ball) to specific concrete objects. Lynne Rudder Baker (Baker, 1997) outlines Gibbard’s 
attack on this assignment of properties, which is also an attack on essentialism itself, as 
consisting of the following three premises, which she takes verbatim from different parts 
of his essay: 
(a) “Modal expressions do not apply to concrete things independently of the way 
that they are designated.”  
(b) “A property, if it is to be a property, must apply or not apply to a thing 
independently of the way that it is designated.”  
      ∴ (c) “Expressions constructed with modal operators...simply do not give properties 
of concrete things” 
 The key to Gibbard’s argument is that whenever we refer to an object with a 
modal property, we are only able to do so by using a referral term that implies the object 
is of a certain kind. Mark Johnston describes what is meant by this well (Johnston, 1992): 
"Goliath" not only picks out the statue but it also, perhaps with the cooperation of 
context, indicates a particular counterpart relation or set of necessary and 
sufficient qualitative conditions for tracing Goliath across the worlds—if you like, 
the "statue" counterpart relation 
It is this argument that causes trouble for theories of colocation that appeal to mere 
differences in persistence conditions to distinguish objects. Without being able to assign 
modal expressions,  especially persistence conditions, to specific concrete objects, we are 
left only with what is evident from the material composition of an object.  
 Karen Bennett calls this problem the “grounding problem,” based on the fact that it 
is unclear what could ground any of the alleged differences in the applicability of modal 
expressions (Bennett, 2004). Bennett also claims that there are differences in properties 
she claims not to be modal, which the grounding problem must also address. Her 
examples include an object’s being innovative, valuable, or well-made.  
 In the case of the statue and the clay, or any similar pair of colocated objects, the 
objects are made of the exact same particles of matter. This collection of matter is 
obviously identical to itself. So, at all times during which an object is not being referred 
to by a certain name, the only properties the object has derive from being composed of 
those particles of matter. Accordingly, any objects constituted by those same particles 
must have all and only the exact same properties, and would thus be identical. Any 
differences in properties would only arise through someone’s referring to the object a 
certain way, but the act of referring to an object does not actually alter the object. 
Accordingly, while we may consider an object to have different properties when 
discussed as a lump than it does when discussed as a statue, the actual concrete object 
does not innately possess any of those inconsistent properties. These are the claims that 
Gibbard puts forward to argue for contingent identity, but Baker is right in pointing out 
that the first of his three premises is contentious and open to counterexamples. Baker 
presents such a counterexample as follows (Baker, 1997):  
“… modal expressions include not only predicates like ‘is essentially a statue’, 
but also many other kinds of predicates. Suppose that a surgeon removes a bullet 
from a wounded soldier’s shoulder, and later presents the bullet to the injured 
soldier and declares: ‘This thing could have killed you.’ Then it seems true of that 
particular bullet, independently of the way that it is designated, that it could have 
killed the soldier. In general, predicates ascribing abilities and powers to concrete 
things, independently of  the way that they are designated, entail that modal 
expressions apply to concrete things.” 
 Her argument here appears to be correct, though it would be strengthened by not 
referring to the object as a “bullet” each time; her claims are more obviously true qua 
bullet, as Gibbard would say, than they are in general pertaining to the indicated object. 
We can thus say, concerning that very object, that it would have killed the soldier. To 
illustrate why Baker is right, we must examine Gibbard’s tactic in coming to the premise 
Baker is denying. He uses the concept of possible worlds, stating that we cannot know if 
a given object exists in another possible world independent of the way to which it is 
referred. Suppose we have two designated terms to refer to the same concrete object — 
for Gibbard they are “Goliath” the statue and “Lump1” the lump of clay. If we ask 
whether Goliath exists in another world, the question is meaningless unless it is 
understood that Goliath refers to the object as a statue, or qua statue. “Meaningful cross-
world identities of such things as statues, it begins to seem, must be identities qua 
something: qua statue or qua lump, qua Goliath or qua Lump1. It makes sense to talk of 
the ‘same statue’ in different possible worlds, but no sense to talk of the ‘same thing’ ” 
(Gibbard, 1975).  
He summarizes his reasoning behind this as follows: A specific designator will 
always refer to an object of some specific kind, and for each kind there is a specific set of 
persistence conditions (and presumably other modal expressions as well). “In rare cases, 
at least,” he writes, “one thing will be of two different kinds, with different persistence 
criteria, and whereas one proper name refers to it as a thing of one kind, another proper 
name will refer to it as a thing of another kind” (Gibbard, 1975).  
The consequences of accepting this view, which must be accepted for claim (a) to 
also be acceptable, are counterintuitive. An object of two kinds is an object that has two 
sets of persistence conditions, but it only has each set of persistence conditions relative to 
the method to which it is referred. What are the persistence conditions, then, of an object 
never referred to as being of a certain kind, even if it is in fact of two kinds? Gibbard is 
not simply saying we don’t know or never express the persistence conditions — he says 
“modal expressions do not apply” to that object. It seems to me, then, that an object never 
referred to or perhaps even thought of as having any kind would have no persistence 
conditions at all. An object with no persistence conditions, I believe, is simply 
inconceivable.  The only salvageable, intuitive conclusion to draw from the statement 
“that has no persistence conditions” would be that the object will endure forever, but 
surely Gibbard does not think that, without referral, every concrete object would be 
indestructible and eternal. 
The one alternative I can come up with, that an object not referred to qua 
something has the persistence conditions of all the kinds of which it is a member, leads to 
an even more egregious problem. Given this view, an object could both survive and not 
survive the same event.  
This is why Gibbard says it makes no sense to talk of the same “thing” in different 
possible worlds. Without referring to the object qua something, it seeming has either no 
persistence conditions or inconsistent persistence conditions. But I believe that the better 
view is one that allows us to speak of the same thing across different possible worlds. 
Given a view that claims each object can be of only exactly one kind, we are able to 
speak of objects across different possible worlds without worrying about the method to 
which they are referred, and we avoid cases like those just described where extremely 
counterintuitive results are reached regarding persistence conditions. 
Gibbard’s argument, as it poses a threat to colocation, is reliant on the existence 
of objects which are of two or more kinds. But as we have just examined, a view in which 
an object has multiple possible sets of persistence conditions, all of which only apply 
based on the method of referral to that object, leads to very counterintuitive 
consequences. In order to pose a threat to colocation, Gibbard’s theory would need to 
show that there is no available reason not to claim identity between the statue and the 
clay. But because his theory offers what seems to be a counterintuitive explanation for 
the persistent conditions of contingently identical objects, it does not manage to show 
identity holds between those objects with any certainty. Given that doubt over Gibbard’s 
central premise, we have no reason to choose a contingent identity view as superior to a 
colocation view. 
 
Alternative 2: Dominant Sortals 
There is another form of objection to colocation which is raised, among others, by 
Michael Burke. His view is motivated by the common-sense objection to colocation that 
it leads to a counterintuitive economy of objects.  
Burke’s arguments have the same goal as the tweaked version of Gibbard’s view: 
To show that there is no available reason not to claim identity in cases where A and B 
occupy the same physical space. The reason we discovered not to claim identity in the 
contingent identity objection was the irreconcilability of multiple sets of persistence 
conditions, all of which apply conditionally based on methods of referral. Burke avoids 
this problem by claiming that, while there do exist objects of two kinds, only the 
persistence conditions of one of those kinds, or “sortals,” applies. He calls the sortal 
whose persistence conditions apply the “dominant” sortal (Burke, 1994). Dominance, he 
argues, is held by whichever sortal encompasses the broadest scope of properties: 
An object's dominant sortal is the sortal that tells the object's sort, the sortal that 
tells what the object is. Of course, this answer raises a new question, in response 
to which I offer (as a first approximation) the following criterion: Of the sortals 
satisfied by an object, the one that tells the object's sort is the one whose 
satisfaction entails possession of the widest range of properties. 
The statue, he argues, encompasses a wider range of properties than a lump of clay. They 
do not need to be specific properties — merely a range of properties. To clarify, a statue 
is not necessarily made of any one particular substance, but for every statue there will be 
at least one substance of which it is made. Therefore, Burke argues, it has an equal range 
of substantial properties as a lump of clay. But in addition to that, it has properties like 
form which exceed the range of properties held by the lump. 
 But simply because there is only one dominant sortal does not mean that an object’s 
other sortals do not still apply. Burke argues that the statue is still a member of the “clay 
lump” sortal — it simply has its persistence conditions defined by another sortal (Burke, 
1994). The obvious question, for which I don’t think Burke has an adequate defense, is 
“Why do the persistence conditions of the other sortals suddenly not matter?” As 
described before when tweaking Gibbard’s view, Burke genuinely believes that the 
original clay lump ceases to exist when turned into a statue, as it loses its old persistence 
conditions and acquires a new set with its new, dominant sortal. The fact that the original 
lump ceases to exist and is wholly replaced by the statue-lump does seem strange, but 
arguing against that specific consequence of this view is both complicated and 
unnecessary for refuting Burke’s overall argument. 
 Burke’s argument is based on the idea that a sortal — not just a dominant sortal, but 
any sortal — is defined as a term that answers the question “What is it?” for some 
potentially existing object. This is an idea he borrows from Wiggins. However, Burke’s 
view on what serves as a genuine answer to this question seems unjustifiably restrictive 
(Burke, 1994): 
Consider the sortal 'piece of copper'. For some objects, mere pieces of copper, 
'piece of copper' answers the what is it question. But what would stop us from 
saying … that there are other pieces of copper, Statue, for example, for which 'piece 
of copper' fails to answer that question? 
“Failing to answer” a question, as I read the phrase, could either mean giving no response 
at all (which is not the case here) or giving an answer that is wrong. It does not mean 
giving an answer that is true despite not being what some might call the “best” possible 
answer. Indicating a copper statue and calling it a piece of copper does answer what it is, 
and does so correctly. Burke himself thinks the copper statue meets the criteria for being 
a ‘piece of copper’ and claims that ‘piece of copper’ is a sortal which the statue possesses 
— he simply does not think that is the dominant sortal. Despite the above quotation, both 
Burke and I believe that the copper statue must surely also be a piece of copper, even if it 
is not a piece of copper essentially. Burke uses the fact that “piece of copper” supposedly 
does not answer “What is it?” to skip over the examination of what happens to the 
persistence conditions of non-dominant sortals. In other words, he ignores the fact that 
the object still is a piece of copper despite not being a piece of copper essentially. I will 
now attempt to show the problem that arises from an object having non-dominant sortals. 
 We have a copper statue. Given this, there are three claims we could make all of 
which Burke acknowledges are true: “We have a thing that meets the criteria for copper 
statue,” “We have a thing that meets the criteria for statue,” and “We have a thing that 
meets the criteria for piece of copper.” It is uncertain which of the first two sortals 
mentioned would be chosen by Burke as dominant, but it clearly would not be the sortal 
“piece of copper.” Suppose, now, that we squish our copper statue. Burke claims that 
now we have an object for which the dominant sortal is “piece of copper.” This means it 
cannot be the same object we had before, in any sense. The original thing that met the 
criteria for “piece of copper” has been destroyed. But now consider the following 
argument: 
1. An object survives so long as no event that would destroy it occurs. 
2. The event of being squished does not destroy pieces of copper. 
3. C meets all the criteria for being a piece of copper. 
4. C is squished, and no other event occurs which impacts S in any way. 
The third premise could be rewritten as “C is a piece of copper.” Burke may not say that 
is the “best” answer for what C is, but insofar as the statement is an acceptable rephrase 
of the third premise (which I believe it is), the statement holds. Based on the four given 
premises, we reach the conclusion: 
5. C survives. 
Burke’s view leads to a scenario where an object can be destroyed by an event that 
should not destroy it. Burke’s likely counter-objection would be to say that I am wrong in 
equating my third premise with the phrase “C is a piece of copper.” But to say that an 
object can meet all the criteria of being a certain kind of object yet still not be that kind of 
object (even non-essentially) is extremely counterintuitive. On what grounds can an 
object be excluded from a sortal if it meets every single criterion? Given this, it seems 
that Burke’s view leaves much room for doubt regarding identity, again for reasons 
pertaining to persistence conditions. He must give some explanation of how the thing that 
is a piece of copper can be identical to the thing that is a statue which does not suffer 
from the flaw explicated above.  
 And his closest attempt fails to do so. He says that the piece of copper is destroyed, 
but the mere copper of which that piece was constituted persists. That mere copper is not 
itself an object, he says, but a collection of copper atoms with no single sum. First, I do 
not hold this view to be tenable for reasons that will be explained in Objection 4. But 
even if we grant Burke this claim, it does not save his argument. E. J. Lowe writes in 
response to Burke, “If it is admitted that many objects can collectively occupy the same 
place as one other object, in what way is this supposed to be preferable to admitting that 
one object can occupy the same place as one other object?” (Lowe, 1995). Burke is either 
forced into inconsistent claims regarding survival or fails to achieve his original goal of 
avoiding colocation. Accordingly, his “dominant sortals” view does not sufficiently pose 
a threat to views including colocation. 
 There are also cases in which an object’s dominant sortal is unclear2. Suppose I 
have a flashlight with a built-in radio. Flashlights, radios, and flashlight-radios all seem to 
cover basically the same range of properties. They all have properties of substance, 
purpose, emitting a certain kind of thing, etc. There does not seem to be any clear way to 
determine what the dominant sortal is. Suppose that I hack off the part of the object with 
the light bulb in it, but the radio still works fine. Have I destroyed the object? That would 
depend on its dominant sortal. If it was radio, the object survived; but if it was flashlight 
or flashlight-radio, it didn’t. Yet we had seemingly no way to know which it was, so we 
do not know whether the object survived or what it’s persistence conditions were. 
  
Objection 3: Additive Properties 
A third concern hinges on the problems that colocated objects present in terms of 
duplication of physical properties — not simply invoking our intuition of “one object in 
any one space,” but pointing out the consequences of colocation as relevant to properties 
such as mass.  
It is this issue that leads Dean Zimmerman to reject colocated objects altogether 
(Zimmerman, 1995). He lays out the problem in terms of bodies and cellular tissue. The 
intuition that these objects are distinct arises from the fact that a body endures over time 
while specific cellular tissue structures dies and shift and are replaced. Supposing the 
cellular tissue at a given time has a mass of 140 pounds, the body also seemingly has a 
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mass of 140 pounds. We can apply this to what Thomasson calls a Principle of Additivity 
of Weights: “where A and B are not identical, if A weighs n kilos and B weighs m kilos, 
A and B together weigh (n + m) kilos” (Thomasson, 2006). The body and the cellular 
tissue, to those who accept colocated objects, are not identical. The body weighs 140 
pounds and the tissue weighs 140 pounds. Accordingly, it seems that, when we put the 
tissue and the body on a scale together, it should read 280 pounds, but obviously it does 
not. This same dilemma would arise regarding a 140-pound marble statue and the 140-
pound “chunk of marble” of which it is composed. Colocation theorists must offer some 
solution to this problem of the additivity of mass. 
One option we could propose is to say that a constituted object has its properties in 
virtue of the thing(s) it is constituted by. But Zimmerman objects to such a view, saying it 
does not give enough credit to those objects which are constituted by others, seemingly 
setting them apart from the unconstituted physical objects (Zimmerman, 1995):  
Of course we are free to say that if my body is coincident with a mass that weighs 
140 pounds, then it too can be said to weigh 140 pounds in virtue of its close 
relationship to something that really has this weight. But why should my body — a 
physical object in its own right, made of physical parts each with its own proper 
weight — have to "borrow" its weight from some other object? 
Given this problem with any view that involves borrowing, there are two alternative 
solutions to the additivity problem which I think show promise. 
Thomasson’s solution is to claim that any two terms whose objects are 
“analytically interrelated” neither compete nor duplicate any properties that they share. 
She describes this in the following terms: “(when a and b both have property P) there is 
no rivalry for possession of a single property instance, nor any ‘doubling up’ of 
properties where a’s being P is an analytic entailment of b’s being P” (Thomasson, 2006).  
What is referred to here by “analytic entailment” or “analytically interrelated” is 
the phenomenon wherein, by the use of human reason, we can understand one term or 
claim to necessitate the existence or truth of another term or claim. Thomasson uses the 
example of a group of simple particles “arranged baseballwise” being causally 
responsible for breaking a window. One could also simply say, if one accepts the 
existence of baseballs, that a baseball was causally responsible for breaking the window. 
Because our reason allows us to understand that “baseball” is an entailment of particles 
arranged “baseballwise,” there is no rivalry for causal responsibility here. Nor for mass, 
velocity, or any other such shared property. 
Sydney Shoemaker offers a similar form of solution wherein properties are shared 
but not necessarily borrowed. Shoemaker defines two kinds of properties: thin properties 
are those that are shared by colocated objects, while thick properties can be ascribed to 
some but not all of the present colocated objects (Shoemaker 2008). It is important to 
note that a property’s being thin or thick can vary based on context, though 
“microstructural properties” like shape, mass, electrical charge, etc, tend to be thin 
properties. Through this conception of properties, a 140 pound mass is shared wholly by 
both a body and a batch of cellular tissue, even though they are not identical. Persistence 
conditions, which are a thick property, are not shared. 
 I am inclined to think that either of these solutions are acceptable. While there is 
no logical proof of their truth, they seem to comply with our intuitions and evidence from 
the real world. Providing that the other sections of this paper regarding colocation give us 
reason to believe colocated objects exist, there must be some explanation for why a scale 
on which I stand displays the weight of my body — not double, triple, or some other 
multiple of that weight. Thomasson in particular offers an attractive solution in that, by 
her conception, each object independently has a certain weight, without any form of 
sharing necessitated. Such properties are simply not doubled up when one object’s 
possessing that property is entailed by the other’s. 
 
Objection 4: Arbitrariness of Composition 
 Peter van Inwagen attacks colocation on its most fundamental level: composition, 
on the grounds that determining its occurrences is too arbitrary (van Inwagen, 1987).  
One who accepts colocation likely also accepts that all material objects greater in 
size than a single, simple particle are colocated with some aggregate of simple particles 
(which I will henceforth simply call “simples,” as does van Inwagen. With this term, I 
refer to the smallest, indivisible particles, but I do not with to name any specifically, 
should science later prove them divisible.) In general, we think that these material objects 
— a statue, for existence — exist in virtue of being composed of some aggregate of 
simples. In the case of the clay lump and the statue — as well as the case of the body, 
organism, and person — we are concerned with whether some single aggregate of 
simples can come to compose two distinct objects, one of which constitutes the other. 
Without composition there would be no constitution, it seems. There would be no objects 
except simples, and because constitution is a one-to-one relation, no simple can constitute 
anything except itself. 
Peter van Inwagen’s view is similar to nihilism (the view that there is no 
composition whatsoever), but he makes an exception for living things. He bases this 
exception on the fact that we know ourselves to exist on Augustinian/Cartesian grounds, 
and surely we must be made of something. This thing that we are is essentially caught up 
in is a “life.” It is also, in all real-world cases, an organism. But van Inwagen would not 
agree that there is any colocation of objects save for the “life” and its aggregate of 
simples. There is no body distinct from the organism distinct from the person (van 
Inwagen, 1990). 
 But why is this the case? Why are we unable to say that some aggregate of 
simples composes a body which then constitutes an organism which then constitutes a 
person? There are two questions van Inwagen puts forth regarding composition, intending 
to show that each has no good answer and thus show how rarely composition occurs. We 
will concern ourselves primarily with the first, which van Inwagen refers to as the Special 
Composition Question. 
This question is posed as follows: “What would one have to do—what could one 
do—to get the xs to compose something?” I will here examine van Inwagen’s discussion 
of this question and his claim that there is no suitable answer available for it. In 
attempting to find a solution to van Inwagen’s problems with this question, I will also be 
concerning myself about when some xs come to compose two distinct ys, as that is what 
occurs in the cases of person-organism colocation. 
 Peter van Inwagen proposes several of the popular possible explanations for what 
could be sufficient condition for composition to occur. They are contact, fastening, 
cohesion, and fusion. In discussing contact, van Inwagen addresses the idea of 
arbitrariness in the following way (van Inwagen, 1987): 
One might suspect that there is no answer to these questions laid up in heaven, 
and that how we answer them—assuming they're worth answering—is going to be 
simply a matter of convention. But I think that we can see that there are at least 
some cases in which mere contact is not sufficient for the production of a new 
object. 
The way van Inwagen writes here, it seems clear that he is looking for some principal that 
holds universally. Were it acceptable that contact, or any of the four criteria discussed, be 
sufficient for composition sometimes but not always, there would be no reason to dwell 
on the cases in which they are insufficient. But van Inwagen believes that showing any 
single counterexample negates the idea of contact entirely, and the same for fastening, 
cohesion, and fusion. Basically, van Inwagen is looking for an answer that removes the 
arbitrariness that he knows some people will claim is inevitable in the above quote. 
And for each of the four criteria, van Inwagen does provide a counterexample 
such that creating the proper relationship between two objects does not make them into a 
distinct, new object. One such example for fastening is the relationship between a nut and 
a bolt (van Inwagen, 1987). When they are fastened together, we believe we have a nut 
fastened to a bolt, not some new object called nutbolt. In Material Beings, van Inwagen 
writes, “it does not follow from the mere existence of certain objects that there is an 
object that has them all as parts; not every set of objects has a sum” (van Inwagen, 1990).  
There are two principle methods of objecting to van Inwagen’s claim. One is to 
deny the above quote and claim universal mereology, that for every possible combination 
of objects, there genuinely exists an object that is their sum. This leads to the existence of 
some rather odd objects. On the more believable end of the spectrum we have things like 
nutbolt, but then there is also the object that is both a frog and a rocket ship, or both a 
horse and a stool. I suppose these objects would be called frog-rocket and horse-stool.  
But this view alone would be insufficient to show colocation of persons and 
organisms. While universal mereology as laid out so far enables us to say that the simples 
arranged organismwise compose an organism, we have not yet established any reason to 
claim they can compose an organism and something else. We must find a method for 
which the xs can compose more than one y. 
Here, the universal mereologist in favor of colocation could argue that not only is 
every possible combination of objects the necessary-and-sufficient set of objects for some 
sortal, but that every possible combination of properties is necessary-and-sufficient for 
some sortal as well. So when we are faced with a bunch of simples arranged 
oragnismwise, we can consider an object composed of those simples and with the 
necessary properties of an organism, or an object composed of those simples with the 
necessary properties of a person.  
On this view, there are now certainly bodies, organisms, and persons all colocated 
with one another and composed by the same simples, but each having different properties 
considered in that combination. But there is also an object that is all three of them, and an 
object that is all three of them plus the planet Jupiter. 
Ned Markosian describes this universal mereology view as the main opposition to 
nihilism and to van Inwagen, but it is only the case if we are truly unwilling to accept any 
level of arbitrariness in our conception of composition (Markosian, 1998). I believe that 
not only ought we accept arbitrariness, but that even van Inwagen has not escaped 
arbitrariness in his view, despite that seemingly being his goal.  
When van Inwagen says the only composed objects are “lives,” it is not 
sufficiently clear what actually counts as a life. Viruses, for example, have been a subject 
of much controversy regarding whether or not they are genuinely living things 
(Villarreal, 2004). But what about a case of dicephalus, a pair of conjoined twins with 
two heads and a principally shared remainder of the body? (I will discuss such cases 
further in the section on bodies later in this paper.) Here we have what seemingly must be 
described as two persons. They have different thoughts, different desires, different minds, 
etc. But there is only one organism to be composed. With this example, I do not intend 
necessarily to disprove van Inwagen, but to show that even with his view, we may have 
to allow colocation. Either van Inwagen will insist that there is only one life, in which 
case there is only one individual, or he will have to allow that there are two lives 
composed of the same simples. Because of this, we have two colocated individuals.   
But when we look at death, we seem to be forced into accepting that even van 
Inwagen’s view is arbitrary. At what point is a human life no longer present. If an 
organism suffers complete brain death, the remainder could still survive and the rest of 
the body could continue to function. This seems to still be a life. But what if, one by one, 
we remove vital organs and limbs and such, replacing them with machines, until all that’s 
left is a functioning, beating heart kept going by some machine. Is this a life? If not, at 
what point did the life cease to exist? Even if van Inwagen wishes to argue that only a 
conscious mental life counts as a life (for only things with that kind of life could know 
they exist), there is a lack of clarity in coma patients and similar cases of greatly reduced 
brain function. 
 If we accept this arbitrariness, then we are able to formulate a more common-
sense view of which objects exist in the world. We can claim that nutbolt is not a real, 
distinct object, but that a block tower is distinct from the blocks that compose it. 
Essentially, this view boils down to the realization that the objects we treat as existing 
tend to be the ones for which we have developed words. If NUTBOLT had been a 
concept since the dawn of language, I likely would have far different things to say 
regarding it. Though in this alternate version of our world, perhaps it would not be the 
word “nutbolt” that were greatly altered, but the word “exists.” It is wholly conceivable 
that the language could have evolved such that “exists” or some other word is agreed to 
apply to all the things for which universal mereologists claim it applies. But for many, 
this might necessitate the idea of existence being altered from its current general 
meaning. Composition is arbitrary because it is a part of how we generally perceive the 
world around us — but our perceptions of the world are undeniably arbitrary, and there is 
no problem with that. 
 In short, there are at least two ways to avoid van Inwagen’s objections: one is to 
adopt universal mereology, and the other is to adopt a position that explains and justifies 
the arbitrariness about what exists that makes van Inwagen uncomfortable. I do not intend 
in this paper to endorse either of these positions.  I merely hope to show that either is an 
acceptable alternative to van Inwagen’s view that would allow us to accept a colocation 
view regarding persons. 
 
Part II: Colocated Thinking Objects 
 In examining objections to colocation in terms of general physical objects, we 
have found no good reason to reject the intuitive ideas that a clay lump is distinct from 
and survives the squishing of a clay statue. It appears a sensible belief that two objects 
can be coincident but not identical, in large part due to their persistence conditions. But 
there is another form of objection to the idea of colocation which applies uniquely to 
people and other thinking, living things. This objection is based on the “too many 
subjects” problem, sometimes also called the “too many thinkers” problem. Rather than 
attacking colocation for being counterintuitive in terms of the quantity of physical objects 
present, it attacks colocation for presenting a world in which actions that ought to have 
only one subject would in fact have two or more.  
The view whose proponents most commonly advance this objection would also 
endorse that, of the original three claims, only (2) is true. This view is often called 
animalism, and tends to use the term “human animal” as opposed to my original choice, 
“human organism.” I think, however, that the meaning animalists intend to convey with 
the term “animal” is better related through the term “organism,” as many may consider 
animals (say, Fido) to have certain mental traits by necessity which animalists do not 
intend in using the term. (That is, they might be as tempted to say that Fido has passed 
away if his fore-brain is dead, as they would in the case of a human.) Also, Eric Olson, 
one of the principle modern proponents of animalism, often uses the word “organism” in 
his writings on animalism as an alternative for “animal.” 
 
What is the “Too Many Subjects” Problem? 
The too many subjects problem is as follows: Suppose that original claims (1) and 
(2) were both true. Most who accept that (1) is true, including myself, believe that (1) is 
the object with which we are identical. We also believe that we are thinking creatures, 
and accordingly believe that the objects which are essentially persons are also thinking. 
But we also believe that we are colocated with and constituted by our organism. Though 
we, the undeniably thinking thing, are not identical with our organisms, it still seems 
from a common-sense, scientific perspective that the organism itself is thinking. After all, 
it has a brain that is functioning properly functioning, and as Olson writes, “What stops a 
typical human animal from using its brain to think? Isn’t that what that organ is for?” 
(Olson, 2003). David B Hershenov seconds this, pointing out the complete sharing of 
atoms between the person and organism: Since the person can obviously think, the 
organism should also have such a capacity as a result of possessing the same brain as well 
as every other atom of the person” (Hershenov, 2005). 
The consequence here is that each thought a person thinks has two subjects — the 
object-essentially-a-person and the object-essentially-an-organism. This is not a 
contradiction in of itself, but Olson claims — and I am inclined to agree — that “this is 
not an attractive picture.” I will here take a moment to explain why the too many subjects 
problem is a problem that must be avoided, not simply another perhaps-counterintuitive 
philosophical consequence.  
Olson first states that have having both the person and organism as thinkers 
simply appears to be a problem of “overcrowding” (Olson, 2003). There is something 
about an action as unique to intelligent creatures (and uniquely first-person) as thinking is 
that makes it difficult to accept the notion of a thought action having multiple subjects, 
even if those subjects are colocated with one another. 
The situation seems especially strange when examining the genesis of an idea. 
Upon hearing the idea, someone may ask “Who thought of this?” The answer would be 
that both the thinking animal and the thinking person thought of it. But we do not want to 
say that each thought of it “independently” of one another. They are constituted of the 
same matter, including the same neurons. It would have been a shared idea, then, with no 
lone conceiver. I do not think it will be possible for me to find a case wherein 
overcrowding alone results in a scenario that is logically unacceptable, but I do believe 
that this idea case is more difficult to accept than the notion of both an animal and a 
person being the subject of a pure physical action, such as standing on a stage. To put it 
another way, returning to Shoemaker’s concepts of thin and thick properties, I do not 
think that the property of having generated a thought or idea can be a thin property. 
Olson finds one of the greatest problems of having these multiple thinkers to be 
that each has a seemingly equal claim to being the proper object of the term “self” 
(Olson, 2003). In a case where each simultaneously thinks, “I am the object to which 
Benjamin is identical,” or, “I would not survive an accident in which my frontal cortex is 
destroyed” there is no method available to explain how one could be correct but not the 
other. (But clearly, there is only one thing which I am essentially and only the animal 
could survive frontal-cortex destruction.) If both are thinking in the same space at the 
same time with the same thought, it seems incredibly strange for one to be right and the 
other wrong — but perhaps it is not impossible3. What is impossible is that there be two 
things to which I am identical that are not identical to each other. If the organism and 
person are not identical, then one of the thinkers must be wrong, but, as just stated, there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  There	  is	  another	  version	  of	  the	  two	  many	  subjects	  problem	  for	  which	  this	  comes	  into	  play.	  Suppose	  we	  hold	  a	  
universal	  mereology	  view	  that	  includes	  an	  object’s	  ability	  to	  hold	  any	  set	  of	  properties	  by	  necessity	  and	  thus	  
allows	  colocation.	  There	  could	  be	  multiple	  objects,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  persons	  ,	  colocated	  with	  one	  another.	  In	  this	  
case,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  only	  one	  identical	  to	  “I”	  or	  any	  other	  proper	  noun	  is	  that	  with	  the	  sortal	  “person,”	  
and	  that	  no	  contradiction	  arises	  from	  differing	  thought	  values	  with	  the	  other	  person-­‐objects	  because	  they	  are	  
not	  identical	  to	  the	  primary	  thinker,	  and	  are	  instead	  constituted	  by	  her.	  But	  this	  version	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  
uncommon.	  Most	  people	  believe	  that	  such	  properties	  generally	  considered	  phase	  sortals	  (Oderberg,	  1996)	  can	  
never	  be	  essential	  to	  an	  object	  at	  all.	  In	  this	  case,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  object	  whose	  sortal	  is	  “redhead	  person”	  to	  
be	  wrong	  when	  thinking	  “I	  am	  not	  essentially	  a	  redhead.” 
	  
is no good method available to determine which one, as both the thinking organism and 
the person otherwise seem equally good candidates for the self. 
It is for this reason that Olson does not accept both (1) and (2). In the section that 
follows, I will examine the argument he uses to show that only (2) is true, and attempt to 
reject it in such a way that also avoids the too many subjects problem. 
 
Rejecting the “Thinking Animal” Argument 
 In order to introduce the too many subjects problem in his essay, Eric Olson uses 
the “thinking animal” argument, which he presents exactly as follows (Olson, 2003): 
O1. (∃x)(x is a human animal & x is sitting in your chair)  
O2. (x)((x is a human animal & x is sitting in your chair)  x is thinking) 
O3. (x)((x is thinking & x is sitting in your chair)  x = you)  
O4. (∃x)(x is a human animal & x = you) 
 It seems safe to assume that, for all mentions of human animals, Olson refers to 
an object that is essentially a human animal, not accidentally. If this were not so, then all 
four premises would hold even if I am essentially a person but only accidentally a human 
animal – but that is not the conclusion Olson wants to reach.  
Let us see what claims the thinking animal argument makes, premise by premise, 
relative to the view which accepts original claims (1), (2), and (3). The colocation theory 
I support suffers no blow from the acceptance of O1. My acceptance of (2) clearly 
necessitates my acceptance of that premise. But Olson’s conclusion, O4, is inconsistent 
with my view — at least once we establish that the object-essentially-a-person is that 
with which I am identical. The premises that ultimately lead to the negation of claim (1) 
are O2 and O3. Were either of these premises shown to be false, or at least sufficiently 
dubious, we would not be required to accept O4. Between O2 and O3, Olson seems to 
consider the former to be necessary given the presence of a brain and the latter to follow 
necessarily from that given (Olson, 2003). Because O3 is reliant on O2, our target is 
premise O2. If the organism is not thinking at all, then there is no object competing with 
the person for thought-subject, only one thinking object in my chair, and no reason to 
equate my self with my organism. 
In the rest of this section, I will endeavor to show that the rejection of O2 is not 
contradictory to the way we think about the world, and explain how its rejection leads to 
a consistent view that accepts (1), (2), and (3). 
Olson claims that the only scenario in which I am thinking but the human animal 
in my chair is not thinking is one wherein it is impossible for animals to think: “You 
think, but the animal doesn’t. The reason for this can only be that the animal can’t think. 
If it were able to think, it would be thinking now” (Olson, 2003). While this claim does 
not seem to follow from any logical necessity, I believe the idea that organisms cannot 
think to be true. To some, this statement may seem a ludicrous denial of the way nature 
works. But much of this disagreement centers around what I believe to be importantly 
different possible meanings of what it is for an object to be thinking, only one of which 
ought to properly be called “thinking.” 
Imagine that you are using a computer to conduct research. The action we will 
consider here as an analogy to thinking is “researching.” There are two possible 
candidates for “researcher” here: you and the computer. Both you and the computer could 
be said to be searching for relevant information, but the sense in which each object is 
performing this action is greatly different from the other. In the act of researching, the 
computer is a tool. It is being used by the person to complete the action in question. In 
common conversation, it seems unintuitive to say “the computer researched the average 
yearly rainfall in Brazil,” and much more accurate to say that you researched it. I believe 
this intuition is correct. The computer, while a tool used in the act of researching, is not 
itself the researcher; you are. 
The organism, then, is not thinking. You, the person, are thinking, and the 
organism, especially its brain, is the tool which you are using to perform that action. 
Thought production is still a biological process consisting in the firing of neurons every 
which way in the brain, but the action of truly “thinking” is performed by the person, not 
the organism. 
But even given the animalist view regarding thinking, there are problems 
animalism faces in terms of the too many subjects problem4. If the organism were 
identical to the mere body, then an organism would not die until the body were destroyed, 
but this does not appear to be the case. Bodies, many generally agree, continue to exist 
after an organism’s death. Because a body would have the same brain as the organism, it 
would too be thinking, so animalism must deny that there is such a body, and thus it 
seems that nothing survives our deaths. Also, animalism must deny that organisms have 
brains as proper parts, because the brain and the organism would be both be thinking, and 
there would again be too many subjects. 
But given my view, wherein the brain itself is not thinking but merely serving as a 
tool for thought, there are several alternatives available for how thinking could manifest 
itself in the person. I tend to favor the belief that thought is epiphenomenal qualia, as 
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detailed by Jackson. This view states that thought is simply a side-effect of neuronal 
activity with no causal powers (Jackson, 1982). Thought could also be a mental property 
of persons. It is not essential that we detail here the precise nature of what thought is — 
we need simply establish the possibility that the subject of thinking be distinct from the 
physical, biological organism. And if we accept property dualism and/or the legitimacy of 
epiphenomenal qualia, we can reasonably attribute the properties of consciousness and 
thought with the person rather than the organism. 
In this section, I hope to have given solutions to the varieties of too many subjects 
problem that will allow for the acceptance of (1), (2), and (3) while maintaining an 
acceptable view of what thought is and what it means to be thinking. Having addressed 
this concern, I believe I have shown that a view which claims persons are colocated with 
organisms and bodies can withstand the popular objections and is worth exploring. In the 
following sections, I will detail the view that I believe to be strongest regarding persons, 
minds, and bodies, as well as explore some of the consequences of this view. 
  
PART III: What is a Mind? 
 What I refer to with the word “myself” is a “person,” but it is also a thing that can 
think. From the discussion in the previous section, it seems quite likely that my self is not 
identical with my brain or the organism in which it is included, because these things 
cannot think — though they are tools generally necessary for the production of thought. 
If there were some thinking thing that were constituting me as opposed to being me, that 
would result in the too many subjects problem; both the thinking person I am and the 
thinking object constituting me would be equal candidates for “myself,” and there would 
also be an overcrowding problem (Olson, 2003). If there is a thing to be called a “mind,” 
then, it must either be an unthinking mind or be identical to the person I am rather than 
constituting it. I am reluctant to choose the latter, because I believe that persons can be 
constituted by bodies while minds cannot.  
 Because of this problem regarding the potential identity between myself and a 
mind, I will put forward the view that a mind is actually an unthinking entity. Instead, I 
would call the mind a “consciousness engine” — an entity that is fully responsible for the 
production of thought, but is not itself thinking.  
 The simple parallel to draw here would be “a mind is a brain,” but it is not quite 
that simple. Were a mind to be simply identical to the material brain, it would persist 
after death so long as the brain itself were not destroyed. For there to be a mind, there 
must be some activity that could be called mental. Campbell and McMahan put forth a 
view that solves this, wherein they argue that a functioning brain is not constituted by a 
“mere brain,” but then comes to be replaced entirely by a mere brain when function 
ceases (Campbell & McMahan, 2010). They do this, however, to avoid the too many 
subjects problem by creating only one thinking candidate. This means they also believe 
there is no thinking thing constituted by the functioning brain, and that the self is 
identical to the functioning brain. But I disagree with this view on two points: First, it 
considers the self to be identical with something that cannot be constituted by a body; 
second, it claims that a functioning brain pops out of existence and is replaced by a mere 
brain at death, rather than saying the two are colocated. 
 A mind, by my conception, is materially constituted by a brain but has the 
essential property of functioning in a specific way — yet it is not itself thinking. The two 
questions I will explore in the remainder of this section are “In what specific way must a 
brain function in order to constitute a mind?” and “What exactly is a brain?”  
 
Functions Necessary to the Mind 
In the discussion of the thinking animal argument, I sketched a very rough 
criterion of the functioning brain, wherein functioning was defined as “operational in a 
way that allows for thinking,” and made distinct from the mere regulation of bodily 
processes. While this criterion is on the right track, it is insufficient in its level of detail. 
The functioning which I argue is required of the brain in order that it constitute a 
mind is of a level and kind that allows for psychological continuity. But we cannot 
simply leave it at that. Among philosophers who advocate psychological continuity 
theories, there is much debate over the specific criteria required for that continuity to 
exist in a manner sufficient to continued personal identity. Some, including Shoemaker, 
feel that memory is an important criterion in personal identity (Shoemaker, 1959). 
Parfit’s view is rooted more in psychological connectedness and choosing the best 
psychological candidate for being a future version of oneself (Parfit, Personal Identity, 
1971). Scott Campbell argues for a Humean view that continuity, and even persons 
themselves, exist as a series of bundled mental states (Campbell S. , 2006).  
The psychological continuity view which I will advocate is similar to that put 
forward by Unger (Unger, 1990). Unger considers his view to be rooted in physical 
continuity, but Shoemaker is correct in pointing out that Unger’s view merely advocates a 
unique and less discussed form of psychological continuity (Shoemaker, 1992);  
Unger advocates for what Shoemaker refers to as “core psychology” as that which 
must be continuous to establish personal identity over time. Shoemaker defines this core 
psychology as simply “basic psychological capacities,” and places it in opposition to 
“individual psychology,” which is composed of memory, dispositions, and general 
conscious thought which we are able to perceive in ourselves (Shoemaker, 1992). Core 
psychology seems to be deeply rooted in the functioning of a brain, and its continuity, 
therefore, is that brain’s persisting ability to function. So Unger’s view of essential 
continuity being physical requires that the psychological which must be essentially 
continuous for a person to exist over time cannot be transported between brains.  
Shoemaker attempts to show the Unger’s view is inferior to those based on 
individual psychology by envisioning a world wherein brains transmit their states to one 
another across a grid of electrical wiring, each one shutting down until it receives the 
psychological state of a neighboring brain. The core psychology of each brain stays put in 
that brain, but the individual psychologies jump around from brain to brain. Shoemaker 
claims that, intuitively, the persons are those who jump around (Shoemaker, 1992): 
If we allow that there are persons in Brainland at all, as we clearly should, we 
have here a case in which continuity with respect to individual psychology  
clearly trumps continuity with respect to core psychology. While the brains in 
Brainland stay put, the persons move around.  
The intuitive appeal of Shoemaker’s claim is obvious. For much of their 
individual existences, the physical brains of Brainland have no individual psychology at 
all. And at each instance when the brain does have individual psychology, the brain has 
memories of experiences that do not involve itself. Neither of these, however, is 
conclusive proof that individual psychology trumps core psychology in terms of being 
essential for a person’s continuity through time.  
Suppose an individual brain is hooked up to a machine with astounding 
capabilities like those machines in Brainland. Every minute, the oldest remaining thought 
or memory in that brain is sent out of the brain via the machine, destroyed, and replaced 
with an artificially created thought or memory. This new memory does not necessarily 
involve the brain in which it is now contained. Interacting with the person possessing this 
hooked-up brain may seem strange: the person would certainly appear forgetful, and 
might have sudden changes in taste or disposition. But for the most part, it would likely 
feel as though we were interacting with a single person. Because the brain presumably 
has quite a few thoughts and memories, each one is present in the brain for some time. 
But if the brain were hooked up to the machine for long enough, it would have no 
continuity of individual psychology relative to its pre-machine self. In this case, I believe 
that core psychology trumps individual psychology. 
Shoemaker even concedes that there are cases in which other psychological 
continuity theorists may find themselves relying on the idea of core psychology rather 
than individual psychology (Shoemaker, 1992): 
“Nor is there any reason why an advocate of a standard psychological continuity 
view could not hold that this sort of  continuity is  sometimes sufficient for 
personal identity–i.e., that there can be cases (tragic ones) in which there is 
continuity with respect  to core psychology and none with respect to individual 
psychology (because individual psychology has been obliterated), and that in such 
a case the person could still survive.” 
Given that shoemaker makes this concession, I am inclined to find flaw with 
Brainland, and I believe there is such an interpretation that would allow for core 
psychology to remain essential even in that case. Given the way that the brains in 
Brainland interact, it does not seem unreasonable to claim that all of Brainland is a single 
mind. Interpreted as one object, Brainland has continuous core psychology with neuronal 
signals traveling about the mind in a fashion that, while obvious not identical with how 
neurons generally function in the human brain, is sufficiently similar that the comparison 
holds. My reasons for making this one-mind claim regarding Brainland will be made 
more clear in the following section on brains, so I will not linger too long on Brainland at 
this moment. 
 For all the reasons described above, I believe that core psychological continuity is 
the best candidate for a continuity theory that prevents intuition-defying gaps in a 
person’s existence and holds across as many strange or tragic cases as possible, but there 
are two specific scenarios in which I want to ensure that this view holds — sleep states, 
and coma states — as these are very real scenarios which can expose holes in 
consciousness-based theories of continuity. While the core psychological continuity 
theory is not strictly “consciousness-based,” it is rooted in the potential for 
consciousness, and thus will face similar, though importantly different obstacles in the 
form of these two scenarios. 
 In their essay “Brain Death and Personal Identity” Michael Green and Daniel 
Wikler put forward an argument for brain death equating person death (Green & Wikler, 
1980). In so doing, they define brain death in a way quite similar to what I would call 
“cessation of core psychological continuity.” Approaching the subject from a more 
medical perspective, they offer a clean and simple explanation of how a view based in 
core mental capacities deals with cases of sleep and coma: 
“Of course, our view does not imply that a person dies with his last moment of  
consciousness. What matters is the preservation of the substrate, not the 
psychological states which it produces. Hence a person who suffers brain death  
during sleep dies at the time of brain death, not the time of onset of sleep. 
Similarly, a person in a persistent coma might be alive if enough of the brain 
remained structurally and functionally intact.” 
 The argument seems rather clear with regards to sleep. As I stated with core 
psychological continuity, it is the capacity that must endure (and that capacity is 
preserved in the substrate), not necessarily any actual execution of that capacity. Even 
those who enter a deep, unconscious sleep continue to exist during that sleep because the 
substrate and its capacities remain intact and functioning throughout, where functioning 
is defined more based on potential.  
Imagine the sleeping brain to be like a television that is currently turned off. It is 
not currently displaying a program, but it has the capacity to do so as long as its internal 
workings remain as they should be, and it is said to be a “functioning” television in the 
sense that were you to hit the power button, it would being to display programming. In 
this analogy, I am treating waking up or being awoken with having the power button 
pressed. 
 The case with comas is more difficult to decide simply, and I think the vagueness 
in Green and Winkler’s statements regarding it is unavoidable. This is not the fault of the 
philosophical view, however, but simply a consequence of modern science being still 
incomplete. In many cases, it is impossible to know whether a coma is genuinely 
irreversible, or even whether the individual in the coma is fully unconscious. In cases of a 
genuinely irreversible, unconscious coma, even if some substrate of the brain is intact, 
this is insufficient to core psychological continuity. Implicit in the term capacity as I use 
it with core psychological continuity is the fact that it is metaphysically possible at some 
point in the future for that capacity to be acted upon. If the substrate is physically intact 
but no set of circumstances could come about such that it would once again generate 
individual consciousness, the person is no longer alive. Mere incapability of present 
science to have the substrate continue in those capabilities does not itself mean the person 
is no longer alive. It is simply the most accurate indicator available that a person might be 
no longer alive. Unger offers a physical example of the sense in which I mean the term 
capacity in defending his view that a brain can undergo disabling events while still 
retaining its capacities through time (Unger, 1992): 
When disassembled, my special car does have the capacity to ("start up" and) go 
70 mph. When disassembled, it's just that she's "in no shape for" that capacity to 
be exercised. Put her back together, and she'll exercise the capacity.  … When my 
brain is quartered, then I'm "in no shape for" my capacity to think to be exercised. 
But, realized in those quarters, there still is that capacity of mine. Put me back 
together, and I'll exercise it.  
Returning to the television analogy, even if the inner workings of the turned-off 
television are intact, we would not say the television “works” if there is no way to ever 
turn it on and never could be. But for patients in comas who are either potentially 
conscious or may regain consciousness, we cannot say with certainty whether there is 
some physically possible solution that would allow their brains to generate individual 
consciousness again. This leads to the unavoidable vagueness of determining whether a 
person still exists in modern coma cases. 
 I hope now to have offered a consistent theory of what functions a brain must 
have in order to constitute a mind. It must have core psychological continuity, defined as 
the continued capacity for individual psychology, which is essentially interchangeable 
with “consciousness.” But in an endeavor to be able to identify which things constitute 
minds and which things do not, it is insufficient simply to know how a brain must 
function in order to constitute one. We must also be sure that the object which we are 
examining is, in actuality, a brain. Because of this, I will now endeavor to explain what 
exactly I intend to refer to in this paper with the term “a brain.” 
 
What Brains Are 
 The reason that I established the necessary functionality of a mind before 
exploring the criteria for an object’s being a brain is that the physical entity that is a brain 
is itself partially defined by this functionality. One criterion of a brain, I stipulate, is that 
it contains parts sufficient to produce core psychology. The distinction between these 
criteria for a brain and the earlier criteria for a mind is that the brain need not be actively 
functioning in any sense whatsoever. A completely dead brain is still a brain so long as it 
has parts that, under different circumstances, would produce a core psychology. 
 Beyond this requirement, however, I stipulate no other restrictions regarding 
capabilities. A brain lacking any part that would give it the ability to comprehend 
language is still a brain. The same goes for all other individual functions except the most 
general possible form of the potential for consciousness production. Because of this, it 
follows that there is no required size or shape that a brain must possess. 
 Another vital criterion for an object’s being a brain is that it must have interacting 
parts. Again, with the use of “interacting parts” I intend the meaning, “parts that could 
interact if the brain were alive, regardless of whether the brain is actually alive at the 
present moment.” I do not require that each part of the brain be able to interact with each 
other part directly, but that each part, through some chain of neural impulses, can interact 
with each other part or neural impulses sent from each other part. (Whenever I use 
“neural” or “neuronal,” this is intended to refer to an object that is a functional equivalent 
of a neuron.) These interactions must be of a nature relevant to the unique functioning of 
that kind of object. Were two such objects to collide physically yet yield no mental 
consequence by doing so, this interaction would be insufficient. 
This kind of view is in some contrast to the view held by Wigan, who argues that 
this level of interaction is insufficient to unify the brain organ, much like how we do not 
consider the eyes to be “one eyes” simply because the information from both indirectly 
meets up at some point (Wigan, 1844, 1985). I believe, however, that the nature of the 
brain’s communication with itself, including between hemispheres, is sufficiently unified 
to render the conventional brain a single organ. 
For example, imagine there are exactly five physically attached brain parts labeled 
A through E. If A and B can interact, C and D can interact, and D and E can interact, with 
all interactions of the kind sufficient for brain-unity, then there are two brains present. A 
and B are closed off from the rest, so they are their own brain. C, D, and E also compose 
a brain, because, even though C does not interact directly with E, the signals from both 
are capable of interacting in part D. This statement that they are brains is assuming, of 
course, that AB can generate core psychological continuity and CDE can also 
independently generate core psychological continuity. The fact that they are all physically 
attached is inconsequential. 
 Given this version of what I will call the “interaction criterion,” there appears to 
be a good deal of vagueness regarding where the brain spatially ends, especially when we 
consider a brain in an average human organism. The brain interacts with parts of the body 
that we traditionally do not consider to be part of the brain, and which I do not want 
included in the brain by my conception either. The entire nervous system, for example, is 
not all just part of a brain. The same is true of the heart, the lungs, and every other organ 
which interacts with what we traditionally call the brain in a human organism. When 
pricked, an arm sends pain signals to the brain, and when a brain sends a different kind of 
signal to the arm, it may lift, bend, or perform some other action. Clearly there is 
interaction between brain parts and arm parts, so a criterion must be developed to prevent 
body parts like arms from being considered part of the brain. 
What makes the brain unique from the rest of the nervous system or from other 
vital organs seems to be its ability to process information, rather than “mindlessly” 
sending outputs or receiving neural inputs. So it would be insufficient to say that each 
part of the brain is capable of both sending and receiving neural signals. As I just stated, 
this would make an arm a suitable candidate for being part of the brain. What is unique 
about the idea of a brain “processing” information, is that the neural output given off by 
the brain is based on a neural input rather than another form. When an arm sends a pain 
signal to the brain, the input that generated this output was not neural. More likely, it was 
pointy. And when the arm receives a neural input, such as a command to bend, this is not 
translated into a neural output but into a physical, bodily action. (This action may result 
in a separate neural output being sent back to the brain giving the sensation of the arm 
bending, but the input that directly led to this output was a biological, physical input — 
not a neural one.) The third criterion for the brain, then, is as follows: “Each part of the 
brain must be capable of generating a neural output based on a neural input.” Not being 
myself a neuroscientist, I do not wish to go into exact specifics on what is meant by 
“based on” in this criterion, but my simple attempt will be to say, “the neural output was 
the result of a purely neural process in which the neural input was the initiator.” (This 
purely neural process need not take place entirely within any single part of the brain.) 
I speculate that there may be an objection to this view on the grounds that I have 
not yet specified what is meant by “part.” A neural fiber, for example, seems to be part of 
a brain yet is merely a pathway. It would be a stretch of language to say that it generates 
output, and perhaps even to say that it receives input. In a similar vein, it does not seem 
that any single proton in an atom in the brain is capable of receiving input or generating 
output. Therefore, I must specify what I mean by “part.” And to do so, I will actually rely 
on the “processing criterion” I have just discussed. A candidate for a “part of the brain” is 
any chunk of matter that is capable of receiving neural inputs and emitting neural outputs, 
along with any purely neuronal pathways through which this process occurs. By this 
criterion, again based on function over form, neural fibers are included with the part of 
the brain that utilizes them, and something so small as an atom does not alone have 
sufficient capabilities to be considered a “brain part.” 
 But even this improved version of the “interaction criterion” leads to some 
difficulties, however, when looking at a brain whose parts interact in a manner that could 
be called “incomplete,” as happens in many patients who have the corpus callosum, the 
greatest concentration of nerve fibers connecting the traditional brain’s two hemispheres, 
severed. (This procedure is undertaken most commonly as a treatment for epilepsy.) I 
believe that, if this conception of a brain is to be viable, it must be able to accommodate 
situations such as these and yield an acceptable, if not immediately obvious result. 
 In “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness,” Thomas Nagel details both 
the findings of research conducted on patients with this kind of poor inter-hemispheric 
communication and the consequences it has regarding the number of present minds in 
these and all individuals (Nagel, 1971). I do not wish to take the time here to fully 
recount all of the findings from the various studies, though they are fascinating in 
themselves, but I will attempt to summarize those elements which are relevant to the 
current endeavor. 
 In the vast majority of normal situations, these patients functioned in a matter that 
indistinguishable behaviorally from those who have not undergone such an operation5. If 
shown an image for any significant length of time, they could afterwards state what 
object had been displayed to them. Their abilities to speak, read, and write were, in most 
situations, unimpaired. 
 But in situations specifically engineered to send a visual, aural, or olfactory 
stimulus to only one hemisphere of the brain, either though flashing images in a certain 
way of blocking off an ear or nostril, the patients were unable to report on what sensation 
had been presented in the same way as an individual with an intact corpus callosum. Here 
is a telling example, from Nagel’s writing (Nagel, 1971): 
“A smell fed to the right nostril (which stimulates the right hemisphere) will elicit  
a verbal denial that the subject smells anything, but if asked to point with the left 
hand at a corresponding object he will succeed in picking out e.g. a clove of 
garlic, protesting all the while that he smells absolutely nothing, so how can he 
possibly point to what he smells. If the smell is an unpleasant one like that of 
rotten eggs, these denials will be accompanied by wrinklings of the nose and 
mouth, and guttural exclamations of disgust.” 
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  This	  is,	  in	  part,	  because	  the	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  of	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  is	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  its	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 Cases like these bring up troubling questions about how many brains, minds, and 
even persons are present in individuals lacking the corpus callosum or suffering from 
poor brain communication for some other reason. Nagel writes that we seemingly have 
five alternatives from which to choose regarding the number of minds in such a patient, 
and the number of minds is precisely what I am not attempting to determine. Ultimately, 
however, he comes to the conclusion that none of them are acceptable. I will first 
determine which seems the most plausible explanation given my conception of the brain, 
then see if there is some way to overcome the obstacles with Nagel believes are sufficient 
to rule that option out. The five choices are as follows, taken verbatim from Nagel: 
(I) The patients have one fairly normal mind associated with the left hemisphere, and 
the responses emanating from the nonverbal right hemisphere are the responses 
of an automaton, and are not produced by conscious mental processes. 
(II) The patients have only one mind, associated with the left hemisphere, but there 
also occur (associated with the right hemisphere_ isolated conscious mental 
phenomena, not integrated into a mind at all, though they can perhaps be ascribed 
to the organism 
(III) The patients have two minds, one which can talk and one which can’t. 
(IV) They have one mind, whose contents derive from both hemispheres and are rather 
peculiar and dissociated. 
(V) They have one normal mind most of the time, while the hemispheres are 
functioning in parallel, but two minds are elicited by the experimental situations 
which yield the interesting results. (Perhaps the single mind splits in two and then 
reconvenes after the experiment is over.) 
Nagel does not waste much time in refuting (I) and (II), and I will follow suit. 
There is clearly consciousness in both hemispheres, and both function, making both 
hemispheres candidates for brains and minds by my criteria. There is no reason to make 
exception for the right hemisphere in these cases (Nagel, 1971). 
Option (III) is unappealing because there is clearly interaction between parts 
across hemispheres in the vast majority of the patients’ real-world experiences. As has 
been the case with many of my conceptions given thus far, a brain and a mind are defined 
by their capacities. These hemispheres do have the capacity to interact — even though 
circumstances can be manipulated such that they will not do so in all cases. This point 
also argues against option (V), because even when the hemispheres do not in actuality 
interact, it is clear from other experiences the patients have that the capacity is intact. 
This leaves option (IV), and it is the option to which I am most attracted6. Nagel, 
however, is inclined to reject is. He gives what I interpret as two main objections to the 
acceptance of (IV). The first is that the mind appears to be capable of multitasking in a 
way that a single mind ought not be able to. He writes, “in these patients there appear to 
be things happening simultaneously which cannot fit into a single mind: simultaneous 
attention to two incompatible tasks, for example, without interaction between the 
purposes of the left and right hands” (Nagel, 1971). His second issue taken is that a single 
mind implies a single consciousness, but if the hemispheres are truly not interacting yet 
still each functioning like a conscious entity, then there must be two loci of 
consciousness-generation, which he claims to be indicative of two minds. 
The first of these two objections does not actually pose a threat to the acceptance 
of (IV), I believe. His use of the word “incompatible” seems to presuppose assumptions 
about compatibility all of which are based on the average human mind. 
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 Simply because a mind is capable of things which the average human mind is 
incapable of does not mean it cannot be a single mind. Suppose that humans were to 
evolve in such a way that brains and minds capable of handling these kinds of now-
“incompatible” tasks became the norm. We would not say that these individuals 
necessarily have two minds if they were also capable of having full interaction and 
unification of consciousness. 
Susan Leigh Anderson offers a more specific explanation on what she speculates 
is meant by incompatible, which she has since replaced with the word “contradictory”: 
“Why are these pairs of actions considered contradictory? I think it is because they are 
different actions each of which are truly ascribed to the individual(s) in question and are 
not performed by different spatial parts of the ‘individual(s)’ ” (Anderson, 1976). This 
does not seem to make much sense, either. Two actions cannot be contradictory solely 
because they are undertaken by seemingly separate individuals. It must also be true that 
they cannot be performed by different spatial parts of an individual. In the cases 
discussed here, it could at most be said that the actions are not being performed by 
different spatial parts, but that is not enough to claim contradictoriness.  
Before moving on from this entirely, there is a stronger version of this same vein 
of objection which must also be overcome. Roland Puccetti, who advocates that all 
humans with the average human brain have two minds all the time, raises the same 
objection as Nagel, but frames it as a contradiction (Puccetti, 1973). He claims that in 
these experimental situation, the patient must be said to both see and not see the visual 
stimulus. Therefore, he claims, to say there is one mind is to break Leibniz’s Law. But 
this version of the objection also seems to me to be flawed. He claims that those arguing 
for Nagel’s option (IV) would, and perhaps must, accept both that the patient has one 
mind and that the single mind both knows and doesn’t know what object it saw.  
This does not seem a necessity at all. I argue that if any part of the single mind 
knows, then the mind simply knows, and the other part of the mind’s denial does not 
overrule that fact. Suppose that you are asked to recall an obscure fact you learned some 
time ago. You may attempt but fail to do so, and thus respond “I don’t know that fact.” 
But then suppose the next morning you wake up and suddenly remember, because your 
brain has been attempting to do so, unbeknownst to your conscious self. It seems that 
your mind knew the fact the whole time — just not the part of the mind relevant at the 
time you were asked. It seems from this example that it is not necessary for an entire 
mind to be aware of Fact X in order for the claim “that mind knows Fact X” to be true.  
Joseph Margolis points out that Puccetti himself acknowledges the possibility of 
cases that seem exceedingly similar to those described in these experiments yet still only 
include one person (Margolis, 1975): 
Puccetti himself acknowledges the possibility of “a schizoid personality with 
divergent impulses; or of dissociative reactions in the same person.” We may 
admit, with Puccetti, that the commissurotomy patient does not exhibit these 
syndromes. Still, either they show how it is possible for there to be two minds in 
one person or else they suggest that Puccetti has not helped us to  see how to 
determine whether there is one mind or whether there are two minds, or more than 
two minds, in one person or experimental subject. 
While Puccetti can and does argue, as Margolis says he can, that there are two minds to a 
person, Margolis is correct that Puccetti’s arguments could just as easily lead to the 
conclusion I am driving at: option (IV) in Nagel’s scheme. 
Now I am ready to move on to Nagel’s other objection to (IV) — the presence of 
two loci of consciousness. Specifically, he states that the acceptance of a single mind in 
these patients must be willing to claim a single consciousness is being produced by two 
independent, yet sufficiently complete control systems (Nagel, 1971). Nagel does not 
argue this point much further, except to make the objection already addressed above, and 
I see no reason not to accept precisely what Nagel says I must. The experiments Nagel 
discusses seem to give evidence that this is in fact how the average human mind works. 
Clearly there is more than one part of the brain sufficient for consciousness, or else one 
of the hemispheres would be left unconscious in the trials. It seems strange to think that, 
at the moment the corpus callosum is severed, one hemisphere suddenly gains a capacity 
for consciousness that it lacked before. So if this is how the mind works all the time, with 
two or more different potential control centers creating a unified consciousness, there is 
little reason to find it objectionable when the same thing happens in these patients. 
Simply because consciousness manifests itself in distinct ways does not mean we have 
numerically distinct consciousnesses from those we had before. 
The one difference between the two cases, on which the entire objection now 
stands, is the word “independent.” In the average human mind, the control centers are 
capable of directly interacting, thus making a single consciousness more plausible. I offer 
several responses to those who believe that the “independence” makes a crucial 
difference. First, my conception of interacting parts and its reliance on the capacity to 
interact calls into question whether it is even correct to call them independent in this case. 
But the real problem brought up by independent is the fragmentation of the 
consciousness. And to address this, I merely return to my argument against Puccetti: It is 
not unreasonable that one part of a single mind be unaware of what is happening in 
another part of that same mind. Ignorance of conscious experiences is included in this 
argument. Acceptance of the view I put forth here regarding consciousness and the non-
essentiality of strict unity allows for multiple bundles of individual psychology to float 
around in the Brainland mind, as well. 
We now, finally, have what I consider to be a viable set of criteria for what can be 
properly called “a brain,” which, when considered together with our discussion of the 
mind, allows us to identify where minds are present. And accordingly, because a mind is 
necessary and sufficient for a person, we can identify where persons are present as well. 
 
Part IV: What is a Body? 
 But a mind is not the only object which can compose a person. The majority of 
persons also have bodies (though brains in vats are people, too). These bodies are non-
essential to a person’s existence, but when they exist in proper relation to a mind, they 
come to constitute a person. In discussing the body, it can be appropriate to consider the 
brain, or the mind it constitutes, to be a mereological part of the body. But we must note 
that, while the mind is the most essential part of a person, it is not the most essential part 
of the body. As we see in brain transplant cases, the body remains when the mind and 
person move to another body. Still, we must remember that this does not mean that both 
minds and brains can and should be considered a part of the body as well. 
 No body can constitute a person unless it includes a mind. The body is to be 
conceived, then, as constituted by all the matter that has a sufficient relation to the mind, 
either directly or indirectly. (It follows from this that one mind can never have two 
bodies.) The nature of this “sufficient relation” can vary, and there are different possible 
relationships they could possess each of which is sufficient to some matter’s being 
included in the body. These viable relationships include control, support, regulation, or 
sensation. Also included in the body are any parts having a sufficient relationship with 
another part, which in turn has an aforementioned relationship to the brain. 
With control, I refer to the ability we have to move parts of the body at will. Thus 
our limbs, our lungs, and several other parts of the traditional human body come to be 
included. By support, I refer to all those organs by whose functioning the mind is kept 
functioning. By regulation, I refer to the mind’s role in keeping several organs working in 
tandem and maintaining a bodily balance. This is essentially the same as support, but 
with the roles of the brain and the body reversed. And lastly, by sensation I refer to those 
parts of the body that give us sensations as conscious states by sending signals to the 
mind. This set of criteria is an attempt to lay out the functions of the nervous system in 
such a way that, were a species to evolve in such a way that these functions were 
accomplished by a mechanism biologically different from nervous systems in currently 
existing organisms, this conception would still be applicable.  
There is some debate over whether a person’s mind must accept a body part — in 
additional to the neural criteria I have given — for that body part to be reasonably 
considered part of that person. Feinberg and Keenan describe several cases wherein 
patients suffered disorders that caused them to treat certain parts of their body as not 
being their own (Feinberg & Keenan, 2005). Of the many disorders they discuss, the 
most relevant to our discussion of the body here is asomatognosia. Asomatognosia is “a 
condition in which the patient demonstrates delusional misidentification of a part of the 
body. Asomatognosia typically occurs in a patient with a right hemisphere lesion, left 
hemiplegia, severe sensory loss on the left side, and left hemispatial neglect” (Feinberg & 
Keenan, 2005). In clinical conversations between Feinberg and patients, the patients 
would refer to a part of their body as being its own individual, or having gone on vacation 
without asking.  
Because of the biological states in these patients, it seems the body part in 
question is almost distinct from the body. There is no control relationship between the 
brain and that arm. But Feinberg and Keenan describe the disorder as occurring in 
patients with “severe” sensory loss, not necessarily complete sensory loss. In a case 
where there is still a sensation relationship between the arm and the mind, I would argue 
that the arm is in fact part of the body. The control relationship to the body part is not a 
necessary one, and the sensation relationship, like each of the four kinds of relationships 
detailed earlier, is sufficient on its own. I do not wish to define any part of a person in a 
way that a person’s perception of biological states is given credence over genuine 
biological states. It does not matter whether a person perceives his or her body as being 
part of him or herself — it matters whether it has the correct biological relationship.  
Were a limb to be truly “dead” — that is, with no functioning biological relationship to 
any other part of the body — then this would make it no longer a part of the person, 
despite any physical attachment. 
 Because my view says that all matter that bears a sufficient relation to a single 
mind counts as a single body, it does not allow for a mind with two bodies. It does, 
however, allow for a body “shared” by two distinct minds, thus constituting two distinct 
persons. Abigail and Brittany Hensel are dicephali, conjoined twins who each possess 
what we could colloquially a distinct head but share many parts of their bodies. From a 
TIME Magazine report on the twins (Wallis & Doman, 1996):  
“Though they share many organs, including a single large liver, a bladder, 
intestines and a reproductive tract, their nervous systems are distinct. Tickle Abby 
on her side anywhere from head to toe, and [Brittany] can't feel it--except along a 
narrow region on their back where they seem to share sensation. The girls 
experience separate hungers and separate urges to urinate and sleep.” 
According to the same report, the Hensel twins are able to conduct coordinated physical 
tasks, including walking, running, and swimming. It remains a scientific mystery how 
exactly they are able to accomplish this without having a single nervous system. 
 Were my conception of the body based solely on the nervous system and its 
functions, there would seeming be two minds, two persons, and two bodies present in this 
case. That is why a proper conception of the body must include the entire organism, 
accepting that some elements of the organism bear sufficient relationship to one another 
to make them part of the same organism, while not all bearing a sufficient relationship to 
a mind (though at least one must). With the Hensel twins, the entire organism, excepting 
each of the two minds contained within it, composes a single body that constitutes 
Abigail and also constitutes Brittany. Even though the mind of Abigail may have no 
sufficient relationship to the arm on Brittany’s side of the body, that arm has a sufficient 
biological relationship with parts of the organism that are sufficiently related to Abigail’s 
mind. 
 
Part V: What Sorts of Persons Are There? 
 At this point, I have finished my descriptions of what minds, bodies, and persons 
are. All of these conceptions have focused on function over form, and a consequence of 
this is that there exist all sorts of creatures which meet my criteria for being persons.  
 Let us begin with animals. (It is for this reason that Olson and other animalists 
using the term “animal” to refer to the organism is particularly misleading.) Fido seems 
to have a mind, and a body, and thus would be a person. The same goes for every animal 
with conscious experiences. And our intuitions regarding brain transplants, with which 
my view is in line, support the idea that were Fido’s brain moved into another body, that 
body would now constitute Fido — even if that body were not a dog body. Animals are 
as much persons as persons are animals. This shows the animalist thesis “all persons are 
animals” to be true in a roundabout way that doesn’t quite match their intentions. 
 And I do not want to simply throw in a DNA criterion to persons to make them 
distinct from other animals. First of all, this seems not to comply with cases of inter-
species brain transplant, should such transplants prove possible. If a human brain were 
put into another animal’s body, the majority of DNA in that organism would be of the 
other species. Or suppose, even more outlandishly, that we fused one hemisphere of a 
human brain with a hemisphere of a dog brain (the identity consequences of fusion will 
be discussed in the next section). Would the ensuing person be human? This is unclear as 
well. Finally, supposing a computer or other synthetic object could be developed that can 
generate consciousness, we would have a person that is not even biological, so we ought 
not include a biological criterion like DNA. 
 Perhaps what is necessary to make our discussion here comply with the common 
intuition that the word person refers to a human is to not use the word person at all. As 
we saw with van Inwagen, though, “life” or “mental life” would be too vague. As of this 
moment, I do not believe that such a term exists to distinguish human persons from other 
kinds of persons. Tragically, cat-person and dog-person already have non-philosophical 
meanings, preventing us from using the obvious choice. 
 Though in some sense, even such a line as this may be inappropriate to draw. At 
the core of things, we are the same kind of thing as Fido — we are organisms with minds 
and consciousness. While some may wish to draw a line based on specific cognitive 
powers (self-conception, moral understanding, rationality), such lines seem to always 
lead to cases in which they blur. Suppose a human suffers some trauma that damages 
their mind in such a way they lose one of these capabilities. Are they no longer a person? 
This, to me, seems like too cruel of an outcome, though perhaps those who argue for such 
criteria would genuinely accept that there is no person present anymore. 
 
Part VI: Puzzles of Personal Identity 
 While the view I have laid out thus far offers an option for what we as persons are 
and what we are constituted of, I will now explore how the view handles the popular 
puzzles of personal identity through time. For many, it may be less important to know 
what we are as persons, and more important to know whether some person in the future 
or past is the same person as his or her self in the present. 
 Before addressing the specific puzzles individually, I will describe what I 
consider to be the conditions for which personal identity persists through time given my 
view. Because a mind is both necessary and sufficient condition for a person, I see the 
two as being related such that each distinct mind’s persisting through time guarantees its 
corresponding person’s persisting through time. If a mind should cease to exist, even if it 
only does so by replacement with a distinct mind, the person also ceases to exist and a 
new person comes into being whenever a new mind comes into being. The question we 
must ask in the face of each of the following puzzles, then, is which minds presented are 
identical to one another and which are distinct from all the others. 
 
Puzzle 1: Fission 
 Perhaps the most discussed puzzle is that of fission, or the split-brain. In this 
problem case, a man’s brain is split in half by hemisphere, and each hemisphere is placed 
into a new body, distinct from the original. This simple yet perplexing example has been 
brought up by many, including Wiggins, whose use is summarized here by Parfit along 
with what he considers the potential outcomes in terms of personal identity (Wiggins, 
1967) (Parfit, 1971): 
Wiggins then imagined his own operation. My brain is divided, and each half is 
housed in new body. Both resulting people have my character and apparent 
memories of my life. What happens to me? There seem only three possibilities: (1) 
I do not survive; (2) I survive as one of the two people; (3) I survive as both. 
The first and second options are somewhat self-explanatory, but I will clarify the third to 
mean that the subject survives with two bodies and a divided mind, not with two minds 
both identical to the original. 
 I will begin by addressing the second possible outcome, as I feel it is easiest to 
dismiss. In this case, we suppose equipotent hemispheres of the brain, and given this, 
there would be no method to distinguish one hemisphere as being a continuation of my 
mind and the other as not being as such. Even were the hemispheres not equipotent, as is 
the case in reality, either both have core psychological continuity with the original or 
neither does. If neither does, you obviously did not survive at all, and if both do, then it 
seems silly to say the one of them is not you while the other is, solely because of the 
degree of continuity present. Were either half of the original mind destroyed, it would be 
consistent with my view that the person should survive as the remaining half. One could 
rephrase the fission operation as “destroying each half with regards to the other half.” 
That is to say, as far as each hemisphere is concerned, the other hemisphere may as well 
have been destroyed — the distinction between removal and destruction bears no 
relevance for the hemisphere from whose perspective we consider the other. Given the 
fact that each hemisphere would survive this on its own, it makes no sense to claim that 
only one of the two survives it when it occurs simultaneously for both. 
 We ought now to turn to the third possible conclusion, as any argument showing 
it to fail guarantees the correctness of the first (assuming, as I am, that Parfit is correct in 
regarding these three possibilities as the only available options). The first conclusion is 
the choice of many who feel that intuitively there must be personal identity preserved in 
such a case, but great lengths must be gone to in order to accommodate this view, and 
those lengths are not necessarily consistent with my view laid out thus far. 
 But first, let us establish quickly why this is difficult to accept on face value. My 
conception of the mind does not allow for the “divided mind” as described here. While 
Unger may believe that the divided brain still has the “capacity” to interact given his 
aforementioned car example, I am hesitant to say that these two mind meet my criteria 
regarding interacting parts. That means that there are two minds here, and given my 
view’s one-to-one correlation between persons and minds, there must be two persons as 
well. And these persons cannot both be identical to me because they are not identical to 
each other. They are in different places at different times, have different experiences at 
the same time, have different physical shapes, etc.  
 In order to find a solution that makes this conclusion acceptable, philosophers 
have had to propose odd conditions to have been true prior to the fission operation. David 
Lewis, among others, proposes that prior to the operation, there were two minds with 
shared consciousness (Lewis, 2003) (Mills, 1993). Parfit deems this unreasonable on the 
grounds that we must maintain the ratio of one consciousness to one person, and holders 
of my view must agree (Parfit, 1976). Mills, in response to this whole debate, argued that 
the fission patient had two distinct consciousnesses before the operation that were 
identical in terms of content, but not numerically (Mills, 1993). This is inconsistent with 
my view on the grounds that there is a unified, self-interacting mind present, yielding one 
consciousness and thus only one person prior to the operation. This accommodation for 
accepting the third conclusion of the fission case also appears to fail. At present, I can 
think of no other twist to put on the case such that my view can consistently agree with 
the third conclusion. 
 We appear to have fallen into the first conclusion, that the original person does 
not survive. Yet even this appears to have logical problems. As I said earlier, either both 
minds have continuity with the original or neither does. It seems clear that both do have 
this continuity. How, then, do I not survive if my entire substrate is intact, though 
separated? It is counterintuitive, but the best possible solution my view can offer in 
fission cases is as follows: “So long as it can still function as a mind, a mind can survive 
the irreversible loss of interactivity with some chunk of itself, unless that chunk is also 
itself functioning as a mind.” If the fission operation fails and only one hemisphere lives 
through the operation, you would then persist as that person. But when both survive, they 
are new persons distinct from you though undeniably similar in many ways. As I said, 
this is counterintuitive at face value. One alternative that may be easier for some to accept 
is as follows: “A mind can survive the irreversible loss of interactivity with some chunk 
of itself so long as it can still function as a mind, unless the chunk could have also itself 
functioned as a mind.” Under this view, a person does not survive the destruction of one 
hemisphere, or any amount of mind that, if separated and hooked up to life-support 
machinery, would function as its own separate mind. In an odd way, this may actually 
appeal to common sense. It could be argued that if a person has lost a mind-sized chunk 
of their own mind, they are changed enough to make them a different person. I tend to 
find this last view appealing, though some may say it makes too much of certain brain 
injuries. I believe that either of these conclusions are more acceptable than the idea that 
personal identity is a concept inconsistent with fission discussions, as Parfit claims 
(Parfit, 1971).  
 
Puzzle 2: Fusion 
 Let us suppose now that instead of breaking a mind apart, we are bringing two 
minds together. There are two different cases regarding fusion which I think it will be 
necessary to discuss: First, a case in which two normal human brains are fused. Second, a 
case in which two once-unified hemispheres have been split and are then reunited after 
some time. 
 The case for the former I believe to be rather simple. Before the fusion operation, 
we have two individuals for whom we have no reason whatsoever to claim identity. 
Suppose we are able to fuse their entire brains together into a four-hemisphered mega-
brain. We now have one mind, which means we have only one person. That person 
cannot be identical to both of the originals, because then the originals would have been 
identical to each other. And it cannot be identical with only one of the originals for 
reasons similar to those described in fission. Therefore, the mega-mind and its person are 
distinct, and neither of the original persons continues to exist, though they have 
psychological similarities with the new person. 
 The case with a reuniting of hemispheres that have been split intuitively seems 
different. If we return once more to the example Unger gives regarding the car, it seems 
that perhaps there was one person there all along with a divided mind whose capacity to 
interact was simply temporarily disabled. But I am reluctant to accept this. The moment 
that the two hemispheres began to have distinct experiences for which they had no 
discernible means of communicating to each other, they established themselves as new 
persons. Because of this, I believe that the “reunification” case yields the same outcome 
as the above case. There is a new post-fusion person, and that person is not identical with 
either of the pre-fusion hemisphere-persons, nor with the pre-fission “whole”-brained 
person. In continuing to lay out conditions wherein minds survive, we can create a 
parallel to what was laid out at the close of the fission section: “A mind is replaced by a 
new, distinct mind whenever it interacts in a sufficiently unifying way with another self-
sufficient mind.” Here, the mere capacity to interact with a new mind does not seem 
enough to change the person. If a man walked around with his mind hooked up to another 
a la Brainland but no interaction ever genuinely occurred, it would not seem as though 
this man’s mind had been altered in any way sufficient to render him a different person. 
 
Puzzle 3: Teletransportation 
 Let us turn now to the puzzle of teletransportation. In such a case, the entire 
make-up of a person, down to the smallest existing particles, is scanned by a machine. 
The precise locations, velocities, etc. of those particles are recorded by the machine. That 
person is then destroyed, and another person is built in another location using the 
recordings taken by the machine’s scan. In the scenario, the person is said to walk, talk, 
and act like the person who was scanned (Ord, 2002). 
 The metaphysical possibilities of events unfolding one of several possible other 
ways than the procedure just described makes me hesitant to accept identity of persons 
before and after such a teletransportation. Suppose that the original person were never 
destroyed at all, but that the machine still created some person in the second location. 
Clearly these people are not identical with one another. They are having different 
experiences and their minds do not interact. It seems odd to suppose that, had the first 
person been destroyed, that would have been sufficient to make the two persons involved 
in the whole operation identical.  
 By my view, for a person to survive, that person’s mind must survive, and the 
mind is a physical object. In traditional teletransportation, that object is destroyed. Toby 
Ord describes a case of a more efficient (yet less plausible) teletransporter which 
physically moves a person instantaneously from one place to another (Ord, 2002). This 
does not seem metaphysically possible, but were such a thing possible, Ord claims, we 
are much more likely to consider the person pre-teletransportation to be identical with the 
person post-teletransportation. Regarding myself, he is correct. I am willing to accept 
identity here because at no point was the mind destroyed.  
Hershenov conceives of yet another form of teletransportation device which 
disassembles the person into simples then reassembles the simples perfectly in the second 
location (Hershenov, 2003). This is the most complex case as far as my view is 
concerned. Technically, the mind has been destroyed, yet the mind is reassembled 
perfectly after was could conceivably be a matter of milliseconds. Regarding this case, 
there still does not seem to be strict continuity and thus I am reluctant to claim identity 
between the two persons. Suppose, for instance, that the machine malfunctioned during 
teletransportation, as seems to happen all the time in films. The person would be eternally 
disassembled, and we would be likely to say this person is dead. Given that a person must 
die to go through teletransportation, it seems unlikely to me that the person created by the 
machine is identical with the original. However, perhaps it is still possible.  
The question is whether it is possible for a brain to constitute a mind, cease to 
exist entirely, then return to existence as the same brain constituting the same mind. Of 
all the questions discussed in this paper, this is the one of which I am the least sure. In 
some cases, it even appears arbitrary. For instance, suppose a child built a house of 
blocks, then tore it down. A week later, that child builds a house in the exact same spot 
with the exact same arrangement of the exact same blocks. My intuition tells me that this 
second house, despite being similar in so many respects to the first, is not identical with 
the first. Perhaps that is because, no matter how many other properties they share, they 
seemingly cannot share the property “time at which this object was created.” But this 
property is not shared only if we are already assuming that the second house is not 
identical to the first. We could just as easily say that the houses are identical and thus 
both share the property of being created at some time t1, being destroyed at another time 
t2, and reappearing at a third time t3.  
 But then there are also cases of time travel. In such a case there is still a time gap 
in a person’s existence. The difference is that at no point does the person appear to have 
actually been destroyed or recreated. Perhaps here we must make a distinction between 
an object’s being destroyed at time t and an object’s not existing after time t. In the time 
travel case, it seems that the person might not exist after time t, but it does not seem that 
the person was destroyed. In the case of the block house, a destruction event did occur. 
The same goes for Hershenov’s teletransportation case. 
 My intuition tends to favor the idea that the houses are distinct. I think that any 
time an object comes into existence, it is allowable to say it was “created” at that time. 
And I do not believe that any single object can have two times at which it was truly 
“created.” Given this intuition, I would say in the teletransportation case that the persons 
are not identical. Otherwise, the minds would be identical, yet seemingly have two 
creation times. For the case of revival, it is the same end result. Even though the brain 
could have only one creation time, it seems the mind it constitutes would have two 
distinct creation times were the pre-death and post-revival minds identical. Having said 
this, I want to emphasize that I am open to a view that denies this principle, because other 
of my intuitions lead me to believe that the persons ought to be identical in one or both of 
those two cases. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have endeavored to give a consistent view of what we refer to 
when we use the term “I.” Like many before me, I have called this object a person. I 
believe that a person is always composed of at least one mind (which itself is a brain 
essentially functioning to support thought), and along with that brain a person may have 
other body parts. The body as a whole constitutes both an organism and a person. The 
acceptance of colocation required to accept this view has been shown as tenable, despite 
several possible objections from those focused on maintaining a common-sense economy 
of both objects and thinkers. 
 I have argued that the capacity for consciousness is essential to persons, and that 
the continued capacity for consciousness is what makes a person endure through time. I 
have argued that Unger makes the best argument among prevalent philosophers for what 
is essential in psychological continuity, and share his belief that it will always go hand in 
hand with physical continuity in the real world.  
 Having detailed my view of what criteria are required of brains, minds, bodies, 
and persons, I have endeavored to show that my view is able to reach a consistent if 
counterintuitive conclusion when faced with some of the popular puzzles regarding 
personal identity. 
 I believe the view I presented regarding persons to be similar to common 
intuitions. We do not think we are identical to our bodies or brains, and we believe those 
things will persist after we die. Our intuition tells us that our consciousness makes us who 
we are and that without consciousness, we would not exist. Wherever my view leads to 
consequences that deviate from common sense, I hope to have shown that those 
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